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China-CEEC Cooperation: China’s 




The article analyzes how the 16+1 Cooperation promotes the Chinese new type of international 
relations from four perspectives: firstly, the “16+1 Cooperation” insists on not rejecting third parties 
and promotes the idea of open and inclusive international cooperation; Secondly, the cooperation 
framework adheres to the principle of mutually-beneficial and win-win cooperation, and proposes 
to wisely handle differences and divergences; Thirdly, this framework never engages in zero-sum 
games, instead, it fully respects and closely watches the core interests and major concerns of the 
relevant parties; Fourthly, it is committed to creating a cooperative platform through consultation, 
to meet the interests of all. The article also makes an analysis of the challenges facing 16+1 
Cooperation and gives some suggestions.
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Forward
When Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Russia on 23 March 2013, 
he made a keynote speech at Moscow State institute of International 
Relations titled: “Keeping with the trend of the times, and promoting the 
world peace and development” (Xinhuanet 2013). During his speech, 
Xi proposed to build a new type of international relations with a focus 
on mutually-beneficial and win-win cooperation. He stated that:
“The world tide is moving forward with unstoppable might. 
Those moving with the current will see prosperity, while those 
going against it will plunge to their doom; therefore we should 
abandon the colonial expansion or the zero-sum Cold War 
mentality and keep up with the trend of the times. All countries 
should jointly promote to establish new-typed international 
relations centering around the win-win cooperation. Moreover, 
all peoples of the world should work together to safeguard the 
world peace and push forward the common development” 
(Xinhuanet 2013).
His proposal in handling international relations has been closely followed 
by the international community, with wide interest in checking whether 
the initiative will be implemented in China’s diplomacy. 
From 4 to 6 November 2016, Premier Li Keqiang paid a visit to Latvia 
and attended the 5th Meeting of the Heads of Government of China 
and 16 Central and Eastern European countries (the CEECs). At the 
“16+1 Economic and Trade Forum”, Li stressed that ever since the 
“16+1 Cooperation” mechanism was established five years ago, it 
has become increasingly mature and gathered many valuable and 
sustainable experiences, namely: consultation on the basis of equality; 
mutual respect and mutual support; mutually-beneficial and win-
win cooperation; openness and inclusiveness; joint development 
and interests created and shared by all (People 2016). The meeting 
showcases China’s practice of building a new pattern of international 
relations based on mutual benefit and win-win cooperation, and 
creating new dynamics and a new vision for the “16+1 Cooperation”.
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Under the initiative of the Chinese government, China and the 16 CEECs 
jointly launched the “16+1 Cooperation” framework in 2012. Ever since 
then, China has been actively carrying out “16+1 Cooperation” based on 
the principle of openness and inclusiveness, mutual benefit and win-win 
cooperation, and has achieved fruitful results. The “16+1 Cooperation” 
framework, so to speak, is China’s latest attempt to construct the 
aforementioned new-type of international relations. 
How “16+1 Cooperation” promotes a new type of 
international relations
There are four different ways in which “16+1 Cooperation” promotes a 
new type of international relations. Firstly, the “16+1 Cooperation” insists 
on not rejecting third parties and promotes the idea of open and inclusive 
international cooperation. 
It has been 5 years since the “16+1 Cooperation” framework was 
established in 2012. So far it has attracted attention from the international 
community and the interest of countries and organizations outside the 
framework, with the intention of joining. Greece, Austria, the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Belarus and Switzerland all 
showed strong interest in participation at different stages.  
The representatives of EU institutions were all invited to attend the Annual 
Meeting of Heads of Government of China and CEECs. The EU’s attitude, 
likewise, has also gone through a positive change from an initial period of 
suspicion to the present willingness to collaborate with China. Moreover, 
the EU expects the “16+1 Cooperation” to be the critical platform to boost 
China-EU cooperation. At the 3rd Meeting of Heads of Government of China 
and CEECs, held in Belgrade, Serbia, Greece was invited to attend the 
meeting and worked together with CEECs including Macedonia, Hungary 
and Serbia to build the China-Europe Land-Sea Express Route. Accordingly, 
Greece became the first beneficiary of increased cooperation with 
China, outside the “16+1 Cooperation” framework. At the 4th Meeting 
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of Heads of Government of China and CEECs, held in Suzhou, China, 
Austria and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
were also invited as third parties. Austria is a Central European country 
that maintains a close relationship with the Višegrad Group and enjoys 
influential status in the CEE region. More importantly, Austria is showing 
enthusiasm towards joining the “16+1 Cooperation” framework. As an 
internationally-recognized, development-oriented financial institution, the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development engages in a wide 
range of business in the CEE region. The participation of the European Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development has provided more opportunities for 
China-CEECs cooperation in the financial realm. In addition, Belarus and 
Switzerland attended the 5th Meeting of Heads of Government of China 
and CEECs held in Riga, Latvia, as observers. Belarus has always been an 
important node of the Silk Road on land, linking Russia and the CEECs. 
Switzerland also maintains an extensive presence as a stakeholder in the 
CEE region. Ever since the CEECs were admitted into the European Union 
in 2004, Switzerland has sped up its market accession eastwards, with a 
great number of enterprises investing comprehensively in the CEE region. 
In order to safeguard its strategic investments and tap into a huge market 
of 75 million customers, for over a decade from 2004 to 2014, Switzerland 
started to finance over 300 cooperative projects in the CEE region. These 
projects covered economy, tourism, health, energy, and more, with a total 
of 1.3 trillion Swiss francs. The engagement of Switzerland has undoubtedly 
broadened the scope of the “16+1 Cooperation” framework.
The process of “16+1 Cooperation” has suggested that the initiative 
proposed by the Chinese government is not a closed-off and cyclic 
system. Instead, it is an open, inclusive and mutually beneficial cooperative 
framework that welcomes and supports all willing parties to join in and 
expand cooperation. 
The second way in which “16+1 Cooperation” is promoting a new type of 
international relations is that the cooperation framework adheres to the 
principle of mutually-beneficial and win-win cooperation, and proposes 
to wisely handle differences and divergences.
There exist great differences among the 16 CEE countries, with each 
country having particular demands. The CEE region is not a homogeneous 
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region either. I have participated in a great many conferences and 
seminars hosted by CEECs such as the international seminar on energy 
cooperation among the three Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), 
held in Latvia on 17 October 2016. I used to think that the Baltic countries 
are relatively alike in terms of national conditions. It was not until the seminar 
that I started to realize that each attending representative of the above-
mentioned countries was not there to seek consensus. Instead, they all 
made use of precious time to illustrate why their country (and their energy 
policy in particular) is different from the other two. In fact, this reflected 
the common mindset of CEECs, that the aim of the symposium is to handle 
differences and divergences through communication and consultation. 
The current diversity of CEECs in terms of national conditions, domestic 
politics and foreign policies is the direct result of European integration 
at different stages. To go into detail, some CEECs are EU member states 
while others are not; some are Euro-zone countries while others are non-
Euro countries. As an actor who is deeply involved in the CEE region, the 
EU has contributed tremendously to the accession and integration of 
CEECs to the EU, but such efforts also led to the unbalanced development 
of CEECs. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the contradictions 
and differences among CEECs are common and almost impossible to 
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The “16+1 Cooperation” framework has wisely and flexibly handled the 
differences among CEECs. Specifically, the framework focuses on the 
win-win cooperation and suggests participating countries should seek 
common ground while minimizing differences, learning lessons and sharing 
each other’s successes in the spirit of mutual respect and understanding. 
A case in point is that, so far, CEECs have put forward many proposals 
aiming to integrate with the “16+1 Cooperation” framework and the “Belt 
and Road” Initiative such as the “Danube Strategy”, the cooperative 
projects in the Adriatic, Black and Baltic Sea regions, the “Amber Road”, 
etc. Each one of these initiatives has pros and cons. The “Danube 
Strategy” exploits the estuary of the Danube River, therefore receiving a 
lot of attention from the Balkan states. The Baltic countries, on the other 
hand, are more concerned with the “Amber Road” Initiative which gives 
rise to trade and inter-connectivity among those states. The cooperative 
projects in the Adriatic, Black and Baltic Sea regions focus on regional 
integration and cooperation in the fields of energy, communication and 
transportation, among CEECs that are members of the EU. The different 
initiatives are indeed exclusive to a certain degree, as the cooperative 
projects in the Adriatic, Black and Baltic Sea regions mainly involve 
CEECs that are members of the EU while the western Balkans (except 
Croatia) are excluded. The “Amber Road” was mainly proposed by the 
Baltic countries and Southeastern Europe barely has the opportunity to 
get involved. Based on this situation, the Chinese government has been 
actively promoting synergy within the “16+1 Cooperation” framework and 
the above-mentioned initiatives, by proposing infrastructure and logistics 
cooperation in the Adriatic, Black and Baltic Sea regions. The project 
has integrated all the merits and positives of existing initiatives, offsetting 
their weaknesses. To begin with, it is more inclusive than the cooperative 
projects in the Adriatic, Black and Baltic Sea regions as it involves CEECs 
that are non-EU members. Secondly, it is more comprehensive than the 
“Danube Strategy” as it comprises logistics and infrastructure cooperation 
including ports, wharfs, and so on. Moreover, it is more pluralistic than the 
“Amber Road” initiative as it is not limited to regional trade and inter-
connectivity.
The “16+1 Cooperation” framework has pioneered a new model of 
international relations in the new era of globalization which emphasizes 
mutual respect, harmonious coexistence, mutually-beneficial and win-
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win cooperation between China and CEECs of different social systems, 
cultural traditions and stages of development. China’s flexible and 
pragmatic policies are in line with the vision of CEECs that advocate 
independent choice of their development path. The cooperation based 
on the mutual learning and understanding between China and 16 CEECs 
is a new classic in the field of international relations.
The third way in which “16+1 Cooperation” promotes a new form of 
international relations is that it never engages in a zero-sum game. Instead, 
it fully respects and closely watches the core interests and major concerns 
of the relevant parties.
The “16+1 Cooperation” framework initiated by China neither contests 
the interests of others, nor engages in a zero-sum game. Instead, it takes 
the core interests and major concerns of all parties into full consideration. 
This can be clearly seen from China’s deeds in handling relations between 
“16+1 Cooperation” and the EU. The EU has always been suspicious of 
China’s motives in proposing “16+1 Cooperation”, worried that China is 
adopting a “divide-and-rule” policy which will exert negative influence 
upon solidarity within the EU and the efficiency of related EU policies. The 
EU institutions and Germany, for instance, have voiced their concerns 
over “16+1 Cooperation” on many occasions. In response, China has 
fully acknowledged the EU’s influence as a peaceful power and supports 
EU’s unity and self-reliance, especially at a time when the EU is faced 
with multiple crises such as the financial crisis, refugee crisis and regional 
conflicts, etc. Moreover, China is committed to promoting balanced 
development within EU and EU-China cooperation through “16+1 
Cooperation”, rather than playing zero-sum games. 
The “16+1 Cooperation” framework promotes multiple synergies between 
China and Europe, which has indeed reflected China’s respect and 
concern about the EU’s core interests. Here I would like to elaborate on the 
synergy between China and Europe in the infrastructure sector by listing 
three examples. The first example is that before the 5th Meeting of Heads 
of Government of China and CEECs, there were plenty of reports about 
China’s possible acquisition of the Baltic port. However, China pays more 
attention to the Baltic railway which is a mutually-beneficial project under 
the “16+1 Cooperation” framework and China-EU partnerships. The Baltic 
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railway is an important project funded by the EU that starts from Helsinki, 
via Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Warsaw, to Berlin. Chinese enterprises 
have always been keen on the project and hope to introduce Chinese 
techniques and experiences of building high-speed railways to the Baltic 
region, so as to enhance the connectivity of the EU as a whole. The second 
example is that China is now actively pushing forward the construction of 
the China-Europe Land-Sea Express Route, the Hungary-Serbia high-speed 
railway in particular. The Hungary-Serbia high-speed railway connects the 
north to the south and thus advances north-south connectivity, which is in 
accord with Pan-European transport corridors and has largely promoted 
the pragmatic cooperation between China and Europe. The third 
example is that of Chinese enterprises vigorously promoting cooperation 
with the Klaipeda port of Lithuania. The Klaipeda port deals with freight 
transport in the construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt, and is the 
perfect convergence of freight that departs from China and arrives at 
North Europe and West Europe via Central Asia, Russia, Belarus, and 
Klaipeda of Lithuania. According to the Development Plan of CR Express 
Construction 2016-2020, issued by the National Development and Reform 
Committee, the construction of the China-Europe railway transport 
corridor, with transportation hubs, should be completed by 2020 so as to 
promote China-Europe freight transport and trade to the greatest extent. 
Many CEECs, including Lithuania, will play the role of a transportation hub 
in the construction of the corridor. In a nutshell, “16+1 Cooperation” has 
truly boosted China-Europe cooperation and will become a new driving 
force for furthering that cooperation. 
The fourth and final way in which “16+1 Cooperation” is emblematic of 
a new type of international relations is how it is committed to creating a 
cooperative platform through consultation, to meet the interests of all.
In today’s world, international relations are normally shaped by multiple, 
multilateral platforms such as the G20, BRICS, South-South cooperation, 
etc. They are more like mechanisms playing the role of functional 
platforms. Chinese foreign policy, in recent years, has increasingly given 
rise to platform building and participation, through which China expects 
to create new-types of initiatives for cooperation, and explore common 
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The “16+1 Cooperation” framework has shown how such multilateral 
platforms not only integrate a variety of resources, but also enjoy great 
popularity and a large voice in crucial global affairs. The platform, which 
gathers all sources of information and provides intellectual support, is 
established for all parties to exchange views, brainstorm new ideas, tap 
the potential for cooperation, and enrich practical cooperation. Under the 
general “16+1 Cooperation” platform, there are a range of sub-platforms 
that are more specialized and centralized, as detailed in Table 1.
Table 1: Coordination mechanisms or platforms established or in-progress 
under the “16+1 Cooperation” framework
Coordination 
Mechanism or Platform Site of Secretariat Organizer Progress
16+1 Agency for 
Tourism Promotion 






of Colleges and 
Universities
Ministries of Education 













China Council for 
the Promotion of 
International Trade
Established
16+1 Association of 
Governors
The Czech 
Republic Czech Interior Ministry Established
16+1 Association for 
Agriculture Promotion Bulgaria
Bulgarian Ministry of 




Information Center of 
Slovakia
Established
16+1 Thinks Tanks 
Exchange and 
Cooperation Network
China Chinese Academy of Social Sciences Established
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXIII (78) - 2017
28
Coordination 





Serbia Serbian Ministry of Transport In progress
16+1 Association for 
Logistics Cooperation Latvia
Latvian Ministry of 
Transport Established
16+1 Association for 
Forestry Cooperation Slovenia




16+1 Association for 
Health Cooperation
To be determined To be determined In progress
16+1 Association for 
Arts Cooperation To be determined To be determined In progress
16+1 Association for 
Customs Cooperation To be determined To be determined In progress
16+1 Association for 
Energy Cooperation Romania To be determined In progress
16+1 Association for 
Maritime Cooperation Poland To be determined In progress
16+1 Coordination 
Center for Cultural 
Cooperation
Macedonia To be determined In progress
As a matter of fact, “16+1 Cooperation” has been well-received in the 
past 5 years. In spite of ups and downs, most CEECs started to take a 
proactive attitude towards the cooperation framework soon after realizing 
its positives. A Baltic diplomat once told me that the Baltic countries 
are more inclined to join the cooperation platform initiated by North 
European countries rather than the “16+1”, because the Baltic states are 
quite different from most CEECs in terms of history, national condition, 
comprehensive capability, domestic policy and diplomacy. In response 
to this, I said that differences never prevail over collaboration, nor do they 
prevent a country from joining a cooperative platform. The BRICs are 
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obviously more diversified in terms of social and economic systems, size 
of the country, race and color. Still, BRICs cooperation develops robustly. 
The “16+1 Cooperation” mechanism has offered a new window and a 
rare opportunity for collaboration between China and CEECs. It turned 
out that the Baltic diplomat was convinced by my views. 
In a word, China’s initiatives regarding international relations has revealed 
a Chinese mindset of openness, inclusiveness and win-win cooperation 
instead of a zero-sum game, and has promoted the healthy development 
of a new type of international relations. 
Challenges Ahead
Any pioneering work is expected to encounter challenges and risks. 
The “16+1 Cooperation” Initiative is not an exception. Firstly, decline 
in economies and trade has created serious challenges for “16+1 
Cooperation”.
The “16+1 Cooperation” framework has always been committed to 
promoting bilateral trade and investment to reach a new high, but 
this objective seems difficult to fulfill due to the global and domestic 
uncertainty faced by “16+1” member states. According to foreign trade 
statistics provided by the Ministry of Commerce of China, from 2012 to 
2014, most CEECs’ trade with China fluctuated and showed a general 
downward trend, except a few CEECs like Poland, Bulgaria, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Montenegro, etc. By 2015, trade between China and most 
CEECs (not including Macedonia) declined, and quite dramatically. This 
downward trend has to do with China’s reforms, attempting to stabilize 
economic growth, and adjusting its economic structure. The decrease 
is also related to the increasing competition in export markets due to 
the growing cost of raw materials and labor forces inside China. The 
capabilities of imports and exports of CEECs, on the other hand, are also 
negatively affected by the global economic and financial crisis. Besides, 
the impacts of larger China-EU relations on China-CEECs cooperation 
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cannot be ignored, as the sustainable economic development of China 
and CEECs was undermined by the EU Anti-dumping and Countervailing 
investigation. It is also worth noting that China’s trade surplus has caused 
concerns for some CEECs. For instance, Polish and Czech media often 
suspect Chinese enterprises of receiving illegal state subsidies and thus 
causing the trade deficit of their countries. 
Secondly, the ever-worsening regional security has posed new challenges 
for the “16+1 Cooperation”. The “16+1 Cooperation” framework has the 
disadvantage of a single function, as it only deals with business and does 
not involve politics. The security situation of the CEE region has been 
constantly challenged by the Ukraine crisis, refugee crisis, terrorism and 
tensions between Russia and EU. The CEECs bordering the Baltic Sea and 
the Black Sea are located at the forefront of the Russia-America and 
Russia-EU conflicts. As a result, the ways of dealing with all kinds of potential 
security threats are regarded as priority tasks by those countries. The 
“16+1 Cooperation” mechanism has indirectly played a role in resolving 
those crises since the necessity of cooperation with China in political 
and security realms has been underlined by CEECs many times. When 
the Ukraine crisis broke out, Poland insisted on calling for each party to 
resist Russia’s “invasion” and acting in line with the EU’s sanctions against 
Russia, but China seemed not to attach importance to it.
Thirdly, the all-round synergy of development strategies between China 
and CEECs faces many difficulties. China and CEECs have different 
understandings of national development. Countries adopting election 
politics focus more on employment, welfare and the sustainability of 
democratic governance. In contrast, China interprets development as 
the rise of economic competitiveness and the integration of economic 
resources on a global scale. The Chinese vision of “pursuing growth” is not 
in accord with CEECs’ goal for stability. So far, the synergy of development 
strategies and initiatives emphasized by China has not produced tangible 
and fruitful results. It needs time, skills and experiences to nurture pragmatic 
cooperation. The differences in state regimes, thinking and behavioral 
patterns between China and CEECs have also caused difficulties in 
synergizing development strategies and initiatives. Apart from that, 
governmental instability, frequent elections and leadership transition 
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Lastly, while enhancing “16+1 Cooperation”, China needs to wisely and 
properly handle its relationship with regional stakeholders. The CEE region 
is largely influenced by great powers. For instance, the EU maintains a 
strong economic and regulatory presence while the US continues its 
military presence in the region (through the NATO security framework). 
Moreover, CEECs are traditionally regarded by Germany as its key partners. 
Russia is also a key stakeholder in the CEE region. Under such a situation, 
how to properly handle relations with those big powers and organizations 
while developing ties with the 16 CEECs becomes a tricky issue for China. 
While the EU is not as suspicious of “16+1 Cooperation” as it used to be, its 
regulations still pose many difficulties for “16+1 Cooperation”. Besides, the 
representatives of EU institutions have emphasized on many occasions 
that “16+1 Cooperation” needs to be more transparent. Only in that way 
can the China-EU cooperation progress. Although Germany, Russia and 
the US have not showed a clear position towards “16+1 Cooperation”, 
their influence upon it is undoubtedly significant. Hence, much effort is 
needed to explore ways of expanding win-win cooperation with more 
stakeholders.
Policy suggestions
I will present four policy recommendations. (1) To actively create 
conditions and promote policy communication. Firstly, to focus on 
cooperation between various frameworks and platforms and achieve 
mutual agreements better policy communication is needed. The “16+1 
Cooperation” framework is only a supplement to China-EU cooperation; 
hence its function is relatively limited. This is especially true in the early 
stages of development. Moreover, the topics under discussion cannot 
be increased without restrictions in every important field, especially in the 
political fields involving security. To maintain the vitality of cooperation, 
strategic cooperation must be promoted and in this regard, “16+1 
Cooperation” and the Belt and Road Initiative have achieved something. 
Regarding the security issues faced by the CEECs, they can be solved 
within the framework of the UN, or within the EU and related sub-regional 
frameworks or regional security frameworks (such as the Organisation 
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for Security and Cooperation in Europe). China can strengthen 
connectivity among various platforms or mechanisms.
Secondly, furthering open platforms would also enhance policy 
communication. The Belt and Road Initiative undoubtedly provides 
“16+1 Cooperation” with a wide platform and development space. 
Thus, in the future it is necessary to tap into the potential of local 
cooperation and third-party cooperation. It is essential to attract 
more stakeholders to become part of the initiative, to further open the 
observer system, to attract the EU and its Member States, international 
financial institutions and international organisations to taking part 
and to create greater energy for the platform. The EU is an inevitable 
influencing factor in “16+1 Cooperation”, and the promotion of China-
EU connectivity can be achieved through this third party. Meanwhile, 
China should actively promote prominent EU Member States, such 
as Germany and France, to be third parties in the China-CEECs 
cooperation.
A third way to increase policy communication in “16+1 Cooperation” is 
to strengthen the knowledge of relevant laws and regulations of the EU 
amongst Chinese policy makers. The CEECs have fully connected with 
the EU in the laws of various fields (even CEECs without EU membership), 
therefore, it is a necessary condition to know the EU’s relevant laws 
for the promotion of “16+1 Cooperation”. Meanwhile, the successful 
experiences of business management in the CEECs, such as Huawei, 
should be studied in order to know the invisible regulatory barriers for 
investment in CEECs.
(2) To develop even greater China-CEECs cooperation, to actively 
promote smooth trade flows and push forward infrastructure 
connectivity. China should: strengthen the promotion of exemplary 
engineering; create new highlights of China-CEECs cooperation; 
provide clearly the model of cooperation between the Belt and Road 
and industrial cooperation; complete construction of the Hungary-
Serbia Railway within two years; actively build the China-Europe land-
sea Express Line; have successful cooperation towards the ports of the 
three seas and to accelerate connectivity amongst them.
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In the process of “going global”, it should be established that 
enterprises are pioneers and pacesetters. Enterprises need to focus 
on communication with various countries in the fields of culture, 
education, etc. Based on the principal status of overseas investment, 
enterprises should work by international rules and market rules, focus 
on the establishment of international social accountability of Chinese 
enterprises, know in-depth local economic and social development 
demands, support increasing local employment, emphasise a 
cooperative spirit with openness, inclusiveness and mutual benefits, 
and remove the misgivings of CEECs.
(3) Based on a long-term strategy, to improve the financial support 
tools of bilateral cooperation. Effective integration of various financial 
tools is necessary to form lasting and steady financial support, focusing 
on the financing demands of CEECs. This can be achieved by actively 
discussing the establishment of a “16+1” investment bank and 
supporting the establishment of regional and multilateral international 
financial companies. Such a “16+1” financial company, actively 
learning from the experiences of international financial institutions 
in the CEECs, insisting on market-orientation and providing financial 
guarantees for bilateral cooperation.
(4) To strengthen publicity, to insist on an “enterprises-first” strategy 
and to promote people-to-people connectivity. China needs to 
advocate the positive ideas of the “Belt and Road” initiative and “16+1 
Cooperation”, to enhance mutual trust, remove misgivings, and to 
expand the channels of cooperation. The process of publicity should 
be forwarded by China’s enterprises and NGOs, with the Government’s 
support and follow-up. It will be more acceptable to allow enterprises 
to give publicity, as they are better suited for influencing society and 
media. Enterprises always connect their own investment and “going 
global”, with the political significance of the Belt and Road and “16+1 
Cooperation”. Therefore, enterprises can tell better “Chinese stories”.
To increase funding for CEECs scientific and academic institutions, it 
would be important to establish joint centres for Chinese studies in 
CEECs, thus enhancing the understanding of CEE elites towards China.
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